BAKU, Azerbaijan, August 7. On August 6, 2026,
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov signed the Merchant Shipping Code of
the Kyrgyz Republic, adopted by the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) in
its third reading on June 25. The document will take effect six
months after its official publication. The new code establishes a
legal framework for regulating merchant shipping, registering
seagoing vessels under the Kyrgyz flag, and forming a national ship
registry. It also enshrines the republic's rights as a landlocked
state to access the high seas and participate in international
merchant shipping in accordance with the norms of international
law.
For a landlocked state, adopting such legislation carries
strategic significance. International practice shows that creating
a modern legal framework often becomes the first step toward
expanding a country's participation in the global transport system.
The code itself does not necessarily mean a Kyrgyz merchant fleet
will soon appear. However, it opens legal mechanisms that will
allow the state to develop its own presence in international
shipping in the future and to implement projects that previously
lacked the necessary legislative basis.
A natural question arises: why does a landlocked state need a
Merchant Shipping Code? The answer lies in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which Kyrgyzstan is a
party. Under Article 90, every state - regardless of whether it has
a coastline - has the right to sail ships on the high seas. Article
91 grants each state the right to independently determine the
conditions for registering vessels, granting them nationality, and
using the state flag, while Article 94 obliges the state to
exercise administrative, technical, and legal control over ships
registered under its flag.
Separate guarantees are provided for landlocked states as well.
Article 125 of the Convention establishes their right of access to
the sea and freedom of transit through the territory of neighboring
states on the basis of relevant international agreements. In other
words, international law not only allows such countries to have a
merchant fleet but also creates the necessary legal foundation for
it.
It is precisely to exercise these rights that appropriate
legislation is required. Without it, a state cannot fully register
seagoing vessels, set rules for their operation, establish
requirements for shipowners, or fulfill the flag-state duties
provided for under international law. The adopted code creates such
a mechanism, allowing Kyrgyzstan, if needed, to use the full range
of tools available under international law in the field of merchant
shipping.
Why, then, did this document appear precisely now?
In early July, Kyrgyzstan faced the risk of fuel supply
disruptions after Ukraine intensified drone strikes on Russian oil
refineries. The resulting decline in Russian oil-product output led
to a fuel shortage on the domestic market, and Moscow began
discussing restrictions on diesel fuel exports to secure its own
needs.
The situation proved sensitive for Kyrgyzstan, since more than
90% of gasoline and about 95% of all petroleum products consumed in
the country come from Russia. Against this backdrop, Kyrgyzstan's
Ministry of Energy announced it was searching for additional supply
sources. At the same time, authorities stressed that fuel reserves
were sufficient, but the need to diversify supplies and logistics
routes became one of the key items on the agenda.
Iran was one possible fuel supply route. Although Kyrgyzstan has
almost no direct trade with Tehran, Iranian ports have long
remained one of the republic's most convenient outlets to the World
Ocean. Had the need to urgently diversify imports, including fuel
supplies, arisen in a calmer geopolitical environment, using this
direction would have looked quite natural. However, the crisis
around the Strait of Hormuz showed that even alternative routes can
come under threat if they are tied to one of the most sensitive
regions of global maritime trade. Under these conditions, the
desire to expand the number of available logistics directions looks
quite rational.
Under these circumstances, the Pakistani direction is gaining
increasing importance. Notably, the adoption of the Merchant
Shipping Code followed just weeks after an official visit by
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to Bishkek. Following the
talks, the two sides named expanding Kyrgyzstan's access to
Pakistani seaports as one of the priority areas of bilateral
economic cooperation. In particular, they discussed more active use
of the ports of Karachi, Port Qasim, and Gwadar, as well as the
development of transport corridors linking Central Asia with the
Indian Ocean.
The adoption of the Merchant Shipping Code was not directly
linked to the agreements reached with Pakistan. Nevertheless, the
timing of these events appears telling. If negotiations with
Pakistan create new logistics opportunities for accessing global
maritime shipping, the adopted code forms the necessary legal basis
that will, in the future, allow Kyrgyzstan to more effectively use
such routes despite lacking its own access to the sea.
The issue is not limited to finding new routes alone.
Diversifying the sources of supply themselves is no less important.
In this context, the states of the northern Indian Ocean take on
additional significance. Saudi Arabia remains the world's largest
oil exporter, and India is among the world's leading exporters of
petroleum products thanks to its large refining capacity. With
stable access to Pakistani ports, Kyrgyzstan could, in the future,
gain another route to reach these markets. No such negotiations
have been officially reported to date, so this remains purely one
of the possible scenarios for long-term supply diversification.
The Karakoram Highway deserves special attention. For cargo
arriving at the Pakistani ports of Karachi, Port Qasim, and Gwadar,
it opens an overland route north through Pakistan and the Karakoram
mountain range into China's Xinjiang, where the route connects with
the Middle Corridor transport network leading to Kyrgyzstan.
Bishkek has not yet announced any intention to use it for
delivering fuel or other cargo as part of a permanent route.
However, this option is hard to ignore. In spring 2026, Kyrgyzstan
already tested a road route to the Pakistani port of Karachi
precisely through Chinese territory using the Karakoram Highway,
calling it strategically important for gaining access to
seaports.
After reaching Kashgar, this route effectively connects with the
transport system of China's Xinjiang, which is already integrated
with Eurasian logistics corridors. From there, cargo can proceed
toward Kyrgyzstan, where the transport framework is further
complemented by the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway currently
under construction. In other words, the Karakoram Highway could
potentially become not a standalone transport corridor but a
southern extension of an already forming network linking Central
Asia to global maritime shipping via Pakistan. The development of
precisely this kind of interconnected infrastructure looks today
like one of the most logical directions for diversifying
Kyrgyzstan's logistics.
Another possible avenue for development could be Kyrgyzstan's
participation in shipping along the Trans-Caspian International
Transport Route, better known as the Middle Corridor.
International law does not prohibit landlocked states from
registering merchant vessels and operating them on any maritime
routes, provided flag-state requirements are met. In theory, this
means that in the future Kyrgyzstan could have its own vessels
operating, for example, on the Caspian Sea, carrying cargo between
the ports of Baku, Turkmenbashi, and Aktau. In that case, the
republic would be able not only to use the services of existing
carriers but also to independently participate in providing
transport services, earning income from operating its own fleet. As
cargo traffic along the Middle Corridor grows, demand for
additional vessels will also increase, meaning such investments
could, in the long run, become commercially attractive as well.
At the same time, the adoption of the Merchant Shipping Code
does not in itself guarantee the emergence of new transport routes
or a fleet of its own. Their development will depend on many
factors, including access to financing, the pace of international
transport infrastructure construction, neighboring states'
willingness to expand transit cooperation, and the overall
geopolitical situation in the region. It is these factors that will
show whether Kyrgyzstan can eventually turn the legal foundation it
has created into real logistical advantages.
Regardless of which scenarios are ultimately realized, the
adoption of the Merchant Shipping Code demonstrates Kyrgyzstan's
aspiration to expand its capabilities in international logistics.
Against the backdrop of the changing geography of world trade and
the growing importance of transport-route diversification, the
creation of such a legal framework could become an important
element of the country's long-term strategy to strengthen the
resilience of its foreign economic ties.
